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THE KEY-MAN SYSTEM OF STATE JURY
SELECTION AS A SOURCE OF VIOLATION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Over four years ago Congress enacted legislation to eliminate
from the federal judiciary the key-man system, a practice of pro-
curing the names of potential jurors that has long been indulged
in the American courts.' Despite the federal action, however, the
key-man system of jury selection remains widespread at the state
level. The key-man method, also known as the suggester system
or the informer system, is a device by which those statutorily
charged with securing jurors go about the initial step of recruiting
names for jury service. If nothing else, the system may be a con-
venience to jury commissioners. A typical operation of the process
is described in a recent Pennsylvania decision.
The two elected Jury Commissioners wrote to the leaders
of the various churches, social, and fraternal clubs, and
committeemen of the political parties ... asking for a list
of names for jury service. The Commissioners also re-
ceived additional names from friends and acquaintances.
The names of the clubs and churches were obtained from
the yellow pages of the telephone directory.
2
Other cases present predictable variations on this pattern of
consulting with persons reputed to know the community so that
these "key persons" might in turn furnish names for inclusion in the
list. Those considered worthy to be consulted may consist of
judges, congressmen, state senators, clergymen of all denomina-
tions, presidents and cashiers of banks, and women in civic organi-
zations.3 They may be members of the Lions Club or officers of
the Chamber of Commerce,4 or conceivably any other persons felt
to be acquainted with a variety of desirable citizens.
The key-man system bears no necessary relationship to the
later procedures through which is -drawn the number of jurors
deemed necessary to fill the panels for a particular term of court.
1. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-74
(1972).
2. Commonwealth v. Carroll, 443 Pa. 518, 524, 278 A.2d 898, 901
(1971).
3. United States v. McClure, 4 F. Supp. 668, 670 (E.D. Pa. 1933).
4. Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System of
the Judicial Conference of the United States, 42 F.R.D. 353, 360 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Jury System Report].
Likewise, it is in no essential way connected with the still later
process by which individuals are included in or challenged off the
specific panel of a particular case. At each of these junctures op-
portunities for selection occur, the key-man system being employed
at only the earliest stage. Accordingly, the word "selection" is used
in this Comment to refer to the initial stages of enlistment rather
than to later actions concerning the membership of an array or
panel. Both grand jury and petit jury selection can be conducted
by the key-man method.5 Similarly, the practice is usable with
both criminal and civil procedure, even though most of the chal-
lenges to the system have been in the criminal area.
The major focus of this Comment will be on the courts of
Pennsylvania, since the practices followed in that jurisdiction ap-
pear to be representative of those in many other states as well.
Reference will be made to other jurisdictions both for further
amplification and in connection with federal decisions dealing with
state jury selection processes. Accordance of the key-man system
with constitutional principles will also be noted, and attention will
be given to the distinction between the constitutionality of the
key-man statutes in and of themselves and the constitutionality of
the results which are achieved when the statutes are applied.
II. STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL BASES OF THE KEY-MAN
SYSTEM IN STATE PRACTICE
Inexplicably, the subject of jury selection has often escaped
the notice of the legal profession. "Even judges are often not fully
aware of the selection methods employed because they delegate
broad powers to the court clerk or jury commissioner; and in prac-
tice these officials operate independently of the judges. . .."
Such dissociation from close judicial supervision may help to re-
duce the burdens of the courts. On the other hand, however, there
is the almost unavoidable inference that this division of labor
serves to diminish the prospect of a fair jury, fairly chosen.
7
Statutory regulations concerning jury selection practices fail to
indicate the extensiveness of the use of the key-man system. For
example, the method is nowhere mentioned in the pertinent Penn-
sylvania legislation," in which the outline of procedures to be fol-
lowed in the various classes of counties is preceded by the following
base statute dealing with jury selection:
5. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 942 (1962). In this section's
discussion of the duties of jury commissioners, there is the general direc-
tive to provide the names of persons to serve as jurors in the several
courts of the county during the year. No distinctions are made between
grand and petit juries or criminal and civil cases.
6. Jury System Report, supra note 4, at 359.
7. Id.
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 §§ 941-88 (1962).
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It shall be the duty of said jury commissioners, president
judge, or additional law judge of the respective district, or
a majority of them, to meet .. at least thirty days before
the first term of the court of common pleas, in every year,
and . . . proceed, with due diligence to select, alternately,
from the whole qualified electors of the respective county,
at large, a number, such as at the term of court . . . next
proceeding shall . . . be designated, of sober, intelligent,
and judicious persons, to serve as jurors in the several
courts of such county during the coming year.9
The jury commissions of the various judicial districts have been
accorded wide freedom of operation within the framework of the
statute, since its provisions have been construed as directory rather
than mandatory.
The degree of stringent adherence that any court requires in
the carrying out of the selection statute will, of course, be related
to that court's view of how integral jury selection is to the judicial
process. If a court views the selection of jurors as a preliminary
administrative detail, latitude will be accorded those charged with
its execution. 10 If, however, the selection of jurors is viewed as
9. Id. § 942. The definition of "directory" and "mandatory" most
frequently cited by the Pennsylvania courts is that articulated in Deibert
v. Rhodes, 291 Pa. 550, 140 A. 515 (1928):
A mandatory provision is one, the omission to follow which ren-
ders the proceeding to which it relates illegal and void, while a
directory provision is one the observance of which is not necessary
to validate the proceeding.
Id. at 554-55, 140 A. at 517. The distinction between mandatory and di-
rectory construction is, of course, found throughout statutory interpretation
and is thus by no means unique to the field of jury selection. On occasion
other terms than "mandatory" and "directory" are used to distinguish be-
tween the discretionary powers and the operative duties which may have
been intended when a particular piece of legislation was enacted. For
example, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has also spoken of the two
interpretive approaches as permissive and mandatory. Commonwealth v.
S.M. Byers Co., 346 Pa. 555, 561, 31 A.2d 530, 532 (1943). At least one
state, Maryland, has held in connection with a jury selection statute that
substantial compliance is sufficient even though the statute is mandatory.
Downs v. State, 78 Md. 128, 131, 26 A. 1005 (1893). See King v. State,
190 Md. 361, 58 A.2d 663, 665 (1948). Recently there appeared before the
United States Supreme Court a case, Carter v. Jury Comm'r of Greene
County, 396 U.S. 322, 323 n.2 (1970), involving the Alabama jury procure-
ment statute, ALA. CODE tit. 30 §§ 20, 24 (Supp. 1967), which requires the
jury commissioners to place on the jury roll the name of every qualified,
non-exempt person. The Court took judicial notice that Alabama courts
had regarded this requirement as permissive rather than mandatory and
did not challenge the validity of this state interpretation. Carter v. Jury
Comm'r of Greene County, 396 U.S. at 323 n.2.
10. See Commonwealth v. Eckhart, 430 Pa. 311, 314, 242 A.2d 271,
273 (1968); Commonwealth v. Fugmann, 330 Pa. 4, 28, 198 A. 99, 111
(1938), citing PA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
among the inviolate rights of trial by jury, the manner of selection
then becomes subject to more exacting scrutiny."' Pennsylvania
has taken the position that the state constitutional guarantee of
the inviolateness of the right to trial by jury does not reach so far
as to include within its concern the details of jury selection.
12
Not only do the Pennsylvania courts provide the jury commis-
sioners with broad discretion in permitting them to depend upon
suggesters who are not provided for statutorily; the options of the
commissioners are also increased by the manner in which the re-
quirement to select jurors from the "whole qualified electors"' 8
has been interpreted. Differing interpretations are provided in
the statutory material for each of the first four classes of Penn-
sylvania counties,' 4 with no specific directives being established
for counties of the five remaining classes. 15 These disparities have
been noted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,'0 which found
them not violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.'
7
No rationale for the diversity of provisions is set forth in either
the statutes themselves nor in the court's comments concerning the
matter.' 8 However, the United States Supreme Court has noted
that in the absence of a constitutional provision on the subject and
as long as the essential requisites of trial by jury are preserved, the
qualifications of jurors are matters of legislative control.19
The leeway of the commissioners is most apparent in the pro-
visions for counties of the third class. 20 There the mandate to se-
lect from the "whole qualified electors" is accomplished by consid-
ering the eligibility of "adult citizens of the United States, residents
of the county and able to understand the English language.""2l In
counties of the first class, the most nearly literal construction pre-
vails, with the phrase being interpreted as calling for a selection
from "a duly certified list of all the registered voters" prepared by
the registration commission. 22 In counties of the second class and
second class A, the requirement is fulfilled by consulting an alpha-
11. Peters v. Kill, 407 U.S. 493, 500 (1972).
12. Commonwealth v. Fugmann, 330 Pa. 4, 28, 198 A. 99, 111 (1938),
citing PA. CoxsT. art. I, § 6.
13. PA. STAT. AnN. tit. 17, § 942 (1962).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 1252(a), 1276, 1322 (1962). The coun-
ties of Pennsylvania are divided into nine classes according to population.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16 § 210 (1972).
15. PA. STAT. AwN. tit. 17 § 942, construed in Commonwealth v. Al-
joe, 420 Pa. 198, 205, 216 A.2d 50, 54 (1966).
16. Commonwealth v. Aljoe, 420 Pa. 198, 205, 216 A.2d 50, 54 (1966).
17. Id. at 207, 216 A.2d at 55 (1966).
18. Id.
19. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 473 (1952).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1322 (1962).
21. Id.
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1252(a) (1962).
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betized list of all persons assessed for the purposes of taxation. 8
The provision for third class counties would seem to be particularly
vulnerable to challenge. In addition to its failure to specify an ob-
jective list from which the jury commissioners are to draw the
names, there is no charge to the commissioners to include among
those eligible for jury service the names of all persons falling
within its description. The statute simply provides that only per-
sons meeting the qualifications shall be considered, with no af-
firmative duty being imposed upon the officials to guard against
exclusionary practices.
Also questionable is the provision that jury commissioners in
first class counties select jurors from the list of registered voters.
The policy of this provision would appear to be that those who have
not registered to vote or who have allowed their registration to
lapse intended to screen themselves out as possible candidates for
jury duty.24 In accepting such an assumption, courts and legis-
latures have not dealt with the possibility that mere disillusion-
ment with the elective process may bear no relation to a citizen's
desire to see justice accorded his peers. If this prospect is taken
into account, it would seem that the phrase "whole qualified elec-
tors" is given the interpretation most conducive to justice in second
class counties, where the phrase is equated with the tax list. Such
lists provide the most nearly complete compilation available to the
various governmental bodies, and continual updating is assured
through annual assessments. In this regard, the Supreme Court
of the United States has stated that the use of tax rolls is the most
comprehensive method short of an annual census.
25
When the discretion of the jury commissioners to choose from
some but not necessarily all English speaking adult resident citi-
zens is combined with the option to rely on a small number of sug-
gesters to provide the names of such citizens, the opportunities for
affecting the outcome of trials begin to become apparent. Label-
ing the procurement procedures as "administrative" disregards this
very definite effect which such procedures can exert on the deter-
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1276 (1962). The desirability of such
diverse interpretations of "whole qualified electors" is questionable. Re-
cent action of the Pennsylvania Legislature indicates the confusion and
slips to which the multiple definitions can lead. Act No. 123, signed into
law June 16, 1972, amending the Jury Law, Second Class Counties of
May 11, 1925 (Pub. L. No. 561), reduced the minimum age requirement for
jurors in counties of the second class to 18. No similar provisions were
made for the other classes of counties.
24. Jury System Report, supra note 5, at 360.
25. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474 (1952).
mination of a case. Even when states grant jury trials where not
required to do so by the federal constitution, they must see that all
relevant constitutional guarantees are assured at every stage of the
judicial process. 2 The history of litigation concerning validly
constituted juries attests to the substantial role which the reputed
"administrative" detail of selection can play in a jury trial.
III. APPLICATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS
CLAUSES OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO
JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES
A. The Equal Protection Clause
The Supreme Court has noted its use of two basic tests in de-
termining whether a challenged state practice violates the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.27 First, there is
the broad test of whether the particular classification in question
rests on some "reasonable basis."2 Under this test, if any factual
circumstances can be conceived which would sustain the classifica-
tion, the Court will assume the existence of those factual circum-
stances at the time when the classification took place, and the
classificatory scheme will be allowed to stand.29 The burden of
showing that the disputed grouping is arbitrary rests upon the
party challenging it,30 and normally the validity of the classifica-
tion is sustained.$1 This test of the equal protection clause has
been applied primarily to cases of application of state police power
to commerce and industry
22
The second test under the equal protection clause is that of a
"compelling interest. '33 This test has been invoked where the state
classification in question is based on a "suspect" classification such
as nationality, 4 race,35 or alienage.30 Such classificatory schemes
must be viewed in the light of the historical fact that the chief in-
tent of the fourteenth amendment was to eliminate all racial dis-
crimination emanating from official sources within the states.
3 7
26. Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 406 (1942). Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968) made mandatory on states the provision of trial by jury
for all defendants charged with serious criminal offenses.
27. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1971).
28. Id. at 371; Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607, 617 (1962).
29. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 464 (1957).
30. Id.
31. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
32. Comment, The Pennsylvania Work Rule, 76 DICK. L. REV. 160,
174 (1971); see, e.g., Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607 (1962);
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
33. Oregon v. Mitchel, 400 U.S. 112, 238 (1970) (opinion concurring
in part, dissenting in part); see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406
(1963).
34. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948); Korematsu v.
U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
35. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964).
36. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 367, 372 (1971).
37. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
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Consequently, classifications based upon race or national origin
are inherently suspect' s and subject to the closest judicial scru-
tiny.' 9 As indicated below,40 it is this second test of the equal pro-
tection clause which has been applied to state jury selection prac-
tices.
Within only a few years after the enactment of the fourteenth
amendment, the Supreme Court granted Negro defendants stand-
ing to challenge their convictions by juries from which members
of their race had been discriminatorily excluded. The earliest de-
cisions formed a landmark trilogy. In Strauder v. West Virginia4 1
the petition of a black defendant led to the striking down of a
statute which on its face provided for the exclusion from juries of
members of his race. 42 In Virginia v. Rives 43 a black defendant
indicted for murder sought removal of his trial to the federal courts
on the ground that there were in fact no blacks in the venire from
which his jury was drawn.44 His petition followed denial in the
state court of his motion that one third or some other acceptable
portion of the jury be composed of members of his own race. It
was held that the denial of that motion was not tantamount to the
deprivation of any right guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment and that a mixed jury in a particular case was not essential
to the equal protection of the laws.4 5 The Court added that
it is a right to which every colored man is entitled, that
in the selection of jurors to pass upon his life, liberty, or
property, there shall be no exclusion of his race. ... But
this is a different thing from . . . a right to have a jury
composed in part of colored men.
4"
In the third case, Ex parte Virginia,47 the Court ruled on the
challenge by a state judge of the statute under which he was con-
victed for the federal crime of excluding Negroes from state grand
and petit juries. 48 The Court sustained the statute in question as
a valid means of enforcing the equal protection clause.49 The fol-
lowing term, the Court held in Neal v. Delaware0 that the guaran-
38. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 367, 372 (1971).
39. Id.
40. See note 52 and accompanying text infra.
41. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
42. Id. at 308-09.
43. 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 322.
46. Id. at 322-23.
47. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 349.
50. 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
tee of equal protection was violated where a statute not unfair on
its face was unfairly administered.5 '
These early cases presaged the formulation of the compelling
interest test, with its subjection of all racial classifications to ex-
treme scrutiny.12  Later cases have extended the constitutional
protection against discriminatory jury exclusion to all identifiable
groups in the community which may be the subject of prejudice.
53
As stated in Hernandez v. Texas,5 4 equal protection is not directed
solely against discrimination arising from a "two-class theory"
based upon differences between whites and blacks.5"
Standing to sue under the equal protection clause is readily
discernible in the case of defendants indicted or convicted by ju-
ries that were selected by means discriminatory to the defend-
ant's class. The Supreme Court has recently held, however, in Car-
ter v. Jury Commissioner of Greene County56 that persons excluded
from jury duty because of their class are as much aggrieved of their
equal protection rights as are those indicted and tried by panels
discriminatorily chosen.5 7 In Carter the Court granted certiorari
to a suit arising from a class action attacking the jury systems of a
county in Alabama. The appellants urged that, although they
were qualified for jury service and desired to be called, no sum-
mons had ever been issued to them because of the arbitrary action
of the officials in charge of juror procurement. The case is dis-
tinctive as being the first litigation to reach the Court in which an
attack upon alleged racial discrimination in choosing juries was
made by plaintiffs desiring affirmative relief, rather than by de-
fendants seeking the reversal of lower court decisions on the
ground of systematic exclusion of a class from grand or petit
juries.
58
The appellants pointed to the fact that whereas three quarters
of the population of the county was black, the largest number of
Negroes to appear on the jury list from 1961 to 1963 was about
seven percent of the total. ' 9 In 1967 the jury commissioners ex-
51. Id. at 397.
52. See notes 33-40 and accompanying text supra.
53. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 205 (1965).
54. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
55. Id. at 478.
56. 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
57. Id. at 329.
58. Id.
59. Although statistical data may be indicative of discriminatory prac-
tice, the Court has not announced mathematical standards for demonstrat-
ing the systematic exclusion of various identifiable groups. It has rather
emphasized that in every case there is necessary a factual inquiry into all
possible explanatory factors. Thus there appears to have been no instance
in which a prima facie case of racial discrimination has been based solely
on statistical improbabilities. In every reversal where mathematical analy-
sis showed a highly improbable result there has also been found to ex-
ist selection procedures that in themselves were not neutral. Alexander
v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630 (1972).
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panded the list in response to certain legislation, but the juries in
question still contained only half as many black members as a
random selection from the entire population would have pro-
duced. 60 The complainants challenged the constitutionality of the
pertinent state statutes both on their face and as applied.6 1 They
urged that the requirement that jury commissioners select for serv-
ice only those persons who are "generally reputed to be honest
and intelligent and . . . esteemed in the community for their in-
tegrity, good character, and sound judgment" provided a discrimi-
natory opportunity of which the commissioners had in fact taken
advantage.
62
The Court refused to strike down the challenged statute. 3 It
noted that nearly every state exacts of its jurors certain require-
ments of citizenship, age, and language. The provisions pertaining
to good character were similarly found to be comparable to ac-
ceptable requirements of other jurisdictions that jurors be discreet,
intelligent, of good demeanor, and the like.6 4 The fact that such
statutes can be nondiscriminatorily enforced provided the basis for
the Court's upholding their validity.65 Although the desired relief
was not granted, it must be noted that the Court did not close the
door to such challenge. No longer may it be said that defendants
in criminal proceedings possess the only cognizable legal interest in
non-discriminatory jury selection.6 It is clear that there is no pro-
cedural or jurisdictional bar to the attack on jury discrimination
by citizens unfairly excluded from the jury roll.67
The opportunity for violation of the equal protection clause
through the use of key persons is most obvious where no suggesters
are included from certain identifiable groups within the jurisdic-
tion. Adamant defenders of the system would answer this chal-
lenge by arguing that even in such a case the key persons who are
actually consulted could provide lists reflective of the general
composition of the community. 68 A more candid appraisal of the
practice, however, leads to the unavoidable conclusion that sug-
gesters from a certain segment of the community will be more
60. Carter v. Jury Comm'r of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 327-28
(1970).
61. Id. at 331, citing ALA. CODE tit. 30, § 21 (Supp. 1967).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 336.
64. Id. at 333.
65. Id. at 336.
66. Id. at 330.
67. Id. at 331.
68. See Smith v. Yeager, 465 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972).
likely to provide names of members of that segment than names of
persons from other identifiable groups.69
In addition to its readily apparent pitfalls, the system can also
be the occasion for more subtle failures. Even where deliberate
attempts are made to include minority citizens on jury lists
through the use of minority suggesters, the key persons may sim-
ply fail to respond to the jury commissioners' requests,70 and state
courts may be indifferent to the implications of such failure.
71
Again, state courts may validate the use of the key-man system
with minority groups who are not accessible to more effective
methods of procurement, as where perfunctory door-to-door sur-
veys are made in urban areas by canvassers among whom there
are no members of the groups discriminated against.
72
At times deliberate efforts to include the suggestions of minor-
ity leaders fail because no records are kept as to whether these
suggesters respond to the commissioners' inquiries. 7 If in such
situations the jury commissioners are not aware that certain groups
are underrepresented on the jury lists, there would seem to be
no likelihood of the commissioners' issuing follow-up requests to
key persons in attempts to correct the deficiency. This situation is
illustrated by Commonwealth v. Carroll.7 4 The Negro defendant
in Carroll appealed his conviction in a court of common pleas on
the grounds of denial of equal protection. In essence, the appellant
attacked the jury selection system of the county as discriminatory
against minority groups and persons in the lower economic cate-
gories in general. The jury commissioners testified that they had
actual knowledge that request letters had been sent to predomi-
nantly Negro clubs and churches, but they were not able to say
that their inquiries had produced any responses. Neither could
they say with certainty that personal contacts with Negroes who
were political committeemen had yielded any names. 75 Despite
this deficiency, the court approved the actions of the commission-
ers.7 6 Their approval was based on the fact that the commission-
ers had familiarized themselves with all the significant elements of
the community and had made efforts to consult leaders from the
various population groups, even though the hoped for results of
the consultations were not forthcoming.
77
Commonwealth v. Carroll would not seem to be in line with
69. Id. at 281.
70. Salary v. Wilson, 415 F.2d 467, 471 (5th Cir. 1969).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Commonwealth v. Carroll, 443 Pa. 518, 524, 278 A.2d 898, 901
(1971).
74. 443 Pa. 518, 278 A.2d 898 (1971).
75. Id. at 524, 278 A.2d at 901.




federal holdings in similar instances. The Supreme Court has
noted that there is imposed on jury commissioners the affirmative
duty to supplement the jury lists by going out into the community
and personally acquainting themselves with the citizenry when-
ever the lists in existence are not fully reflective of those qualified
for service.78 Similarly, the courts have noted that the officials
responsible for administering the jury selection machinery may not
transfer to any other segment of the community the responsibilities
which the law imposes upon them.7 9 Jury commissioners are also
prohibited from using the unresponsiveness of minority key men
as an excuse for validating an insufficient selection method.80
Both those decisions which have approved of the key-man sys-
tem81 and those which have found the deficiencies of the system to
be sufficient grounds for reversing convictions8 2 have recognized
that there must exist the fair possibility of the jury's reflecting a
representative cross section of the community. In Carroll this
necessity is explicitly considered but paradoxically resolved. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court notes that the United States Su-
preme Court has produced a long line of cases dealing with ex-
clusion from jury service as a violation of equal protection.8" They
also note that the concept of a jury composed of a cross section of
the community is clearly embodied in the constitution of Pennsyl-
vania.84 Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded
that the jury selection procedures of the county in question were
not violative of constitutional requirements. 85
The representative cross section test has become increasingly
pervasive over the years. The principle of a representative jury
was early articulated by the Supreme Court on the basis of the
fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection and was em-
ployed to vindicate the right of a black defendant to challenge the
systematic exclusion of members of his race from grand or petit
juries.8 6 Later the Court, on the basis of its supervisory power
over the federal judiciary, extended the principle so that any de-
fendant could challenge the arbitrary exclusion of his own or any
78. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 355 (1970).
79. Salary v. Wilson, 415 F.2d 467, 472 (5th Cir. 1969).
80. Id.
81. E.g., Commonwealth v. Carroll, 443 Pa. 518, 278 A.2d 898 (1971).
82. Smith v. Yeager, 465 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972).
83. Commonwealth v. Carroll, 443 Pa. 518, 278 A.2d 898, 899 (1971).
84. Id., 278 A.2d at 900, citing PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
85. Id. at 523, 278 A.2d at 900.
86. E.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). See notes
41-42 and accompanying text supra.
other class from jury service.87 More recently, a sixth amendment
basis has been invoked so that the principle of the representative
jury appears to have emerged as an aspect of the constitutional
right to trial by jury.
8 8
The failure of the key man system to produce a cross sectional
representation in juries is of sufficient importance that it cannot
be excused by even the innocence of the jury commission involved.
Regardless of the intention of the administrators, the results pro-
duced determine the validity of the process employed.89 No com-
mission should be exonerated by affirming that they acted in good
faith.90 Thus Carroll9 ' and other cases exculpating jury commis-
sioners who had familiarized themselves with all of the significant
elements in the community and made special efforts to consult
leaders from these various population groups cannot be viewed as
normative. Whenever steady and significant disparities are found
in the composition of jury venires, there rightfully rests on the re-
sponsible officials the burden of proving that the guarantees of
equal protection have not been violated.
B. The Due Process Clause
The due process clause has been interpreted as directed toward
two basic objectives.92  The first objective is that of insuring the
reliability of the guilt determining process.9 3 Thus a defendant
cannot, consistent with this first goal of the due process guarantee,
87. E.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1940):
For the mechanics of trial by jury we revert to the common law
as it existed in England when the constitution was adopted. [cita-
tion omitted] But even as jury trial, which was a privilege at
common law, has become a right with us, so also, whatever limita-
tions were inherent in the historical common law concept of the
jury as a body of one's peers do not prevail in this country....
Jurors in a federal court are to have the qualifications of those in
the highest court in the State, and they are to be selected by the
clerk of the court and the jury commissioner .... [E]xercise [of
this duty] must always accord with the fact that the proper func-
tioning of the jury system, and indeed, our democracy itself, re-
quires that the jury be a 'body truly representative of the com-
munity ..
Id. at 85-86.
88. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970):
The Court must look to the specific language of the provision and
the intent of the Framers when the Bill of Rights was adopted.
This approach is necessary, not because the Framers intended the
Bill of Rights to apply to the States when it was proposed in
1787, but because the application of those provisions to the States
by the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the original intent be
the governing consideration in state as well as federal cases.
Id. at 108.
89. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954).
90. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
91. 443 Pa. 518, 278 A.2d 898 (1971).
92. Packer, Two Models of Criminal Procedure, 113 PA. L. REv. 1
(1964).
93. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
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be subjected to trial by jurors who have been intimidated by
threat of mob violence,94 by a juror who is insane,95 or by jurors
who have formed fixed opinions of the case as a result of news
media publicity.9 6
In contrast with the first goal of the due process clause, the
second is not concerned with outcome-determinative matters. To
a great extent it escapes precise definition and must be spoken of
in terms of more elusive objectives such as the assurance of "or-
dered liberty."9 This goal is attained through preserving the gov-
ernment,98 through assuring basic human dignity,99 and through
maintaining respect for our laws and for our Constitution.
100
These objectives are illustrated by Rogers v. Richmond.10 ' Rogers
dealt with the admission into evidence of involuntarily obtained
confessions. The Supreme Court emphasized that such evidence
must be excluded not on the basis of being unreliable, but rather
on the grounds that the methods used to extract it offended under-
lying principles of our common law.
10 2
The thwarting of both goals of the due process clause through
the use of discriminatory jury selection techniques is illustrated by
Peters v. Kiff.1'0  Although Kiff does not deal specifically with a
challenge to the key-man system, it deals in a generic way with
the systematic exclusion of potential jurors and thus provides
guidelines for use in connection with the more narrow key-man
question. In this case a white defendant contended that he was
deprived of his rights of equal protection and due process by the
exclusion of blacks from the state grand jury that indicted him
and from the petit jury that convicted him.10 4 The state courts
had held that because the defendant was not black he had not suf-
fered any constitutional deprivation and that, therefore, his con-
viction would be required to stand.105
The Supreme Court considered the challenge solely in light of
the due process guarantee. 10 6 In addressing itself to the first or
94. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
95. Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912).
96. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
97. Palo v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
98. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
99. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).
100. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
101. 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
102. Id. at 541.
103. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
104. Id. at 494.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 505.
outcome-determinative consideration of due process, the Court em-
phasized that even when the group excluded is racial in nature, the
ramifications of the exclusion extend far beyond racial questions.
[W] e are unwilling to make the assumption that the ex-
clusion of Negroes has relevance only for issues involving
race. When any large and identifiable segment of the com-
munity is excluded from jury service, the effect is to re-
move from the jury room qualities of human experience,
the range of which is unknown and unknowable. 07
Regarding the ordered liberty objective of the due process clause,
the Court stated that discriminatory jury selection procedures in-
pugn the integrity of the whole judicial process.' 08 Accordingly,
such practices are unconstitutional not only because they increase
the risk of bias, but also because they create the appearance of
bias. 109
One aspect of the importance of Kiff to the key-man issue is
seen in its providing wide accessibility to challenge of juror pro-
curement procedures. The Court stated that because of the very
great possibility of harm latent in any unconstitutional jury selec-
tion system, any doubt should be resolved by according the oppor-
tunity to challenge the jury to too many defendants rather than
to too few.1" 0 Prior to this ruling, a number of state courts and
lower federal courts had imposed the same-class rule on challenges
to discriminatory jury selection and had held that the exclusion of
a class from jury service is subject to challenge only by a member
of the excluded group."' Before Kiff the Supreme Court had
avoided passing on the same-class ruling. With the Kiff decision,
however, standing to sue may no longer be made dependent upon
the class of the challenger.
IV. ANALOGY TO THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
In the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968112 the federal
government sought to remove the deficiencies of the key-man sys-
tem from its juror procurement methods. Federal actions of this
type exert at most a persuasive influence on the states. The states
possess the right to establish their own valid selection procedures
and also to create their own relevant qualifications for jurors." 3.
Nevertheless, it is suggested that states take note of recent federal
107. Id. at 503.
108. Id. at 502.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 504.
111. Id.. at 496 n.4.
112. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-74 (1972).
113. Nearly every state requires that its jurors be citizens of the United
States, residents of the judicial district, of a stated minimum age, and able
to understand English. Many states also require that jurors be of "good




legislation as an aid in ascertaining that they themselves are pro-
viding adequate constitutional guarantees.1 14 The states must also
remain cognizant of federal statutory effectuations of the four-
teenth amendment as applied to the exclusion of jurors in criminal
trials on account of race or color (which remains the major area in
which key-man abuse occurs) and as applied to deprivation of
rights under color of law.115 These civil rights statutes make no
distinction between federal and state violations. Jury commission-
ers are specifically cited as liable to fine for excluding or failing to
summon any citizen for jury duty in violation of fourteenth amend-
ment provisions, and state level officials are accorded no differen-
tiation of duty or degree of punishment from that prescribed for
commissioners working within the federal framework." 6
Preceding and influencing the Jury Selection and Service Act
was the Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury
System of the Judicial Conference of the United States.1 7  The re-
port did not limit its survey and recommendations to the needs of
the federal judicial system, but also included a call for extensive re-
visions at the state level.'1 The United States government acted
relatively quickly to correct certain defects which the report
cited. 1 9 Similar problems have often continued in the state courts,
unabated by legislative action.
120
If the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 had been con-
cerned only with procuring procedural uniformity in the federal
114. E.g., State v. Rochester, 54 N.J. 85, 91, 253 A.2d 474, 477 (1969).
115. 18 U.S.C. §§ 242-43 (1969).
116. "[w]hoever being an officer or other person charged with any
duty in the selection or summoning of jurors, excludes or fails to summon
any citizen [because of race] shall be fined not more than $5000." 18 U.S.C.
§ 243 (1969).
117. 42 F.R.D. 353 (1967).
118. Id. at 367-68.
119. Congress responded by passing the Jury Selection and Service
Act of 1968. 28 U.S.C. §§. 1861-74 (1972), replacing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-74
(1967).
120. One state that has heeded the necessity to reform its jury selec-
tion statutes is Maryland. In 1969 major sections of its code provisions
in this area were repealed. The new provisions closely parallel the ra-
tionale and emphasis and even the wording of the federal Jury Selection
and Service Act of 1968. MD. ANN. CODE art. 51, §§ 1-22 (1972). One pos-
sible occasion for discrimination is found in the provision for selection of
jurors not only from the voter registration lists but also from "such addi-
tional sources as may be prescribed." MD. AN-N. CODE art. 51, § 3. The cir-
cuit court of any county is also accorded the privilege of modifying its
plan at any time provided it promptly notifies the Court of Appeals of
the modification and files copies of the changes with the court. MD.
ANN. CODE art. 51, § 14d. As of this date, there is no reported litigation
challenging the modification provisions.
system, the states would not be remiss in failing to look to it for
direction. The basis of the Act is not, however, simply procedural.
It was put into law to insure substantive rights of a type which
must be guaranteed in all courts.
The purpose of the act is to provide improved judicial ma-
chinery for the selection without discrimination ... of
grand and petit juries. Its aim is to assure litigants that
potential jurors will be selected at random from a repre-
sentative cross section of the community and that all qual-





The legislative history of the Act similarly attests to the substan-
tive motives behind its adoption. "The technique of random selec-
tion tends to insure, according to the laws of probability, that dis-
tortion most often will be minor and will even out in the long
run."1
22
A comparison of the 1968 Act with its predecessor 12 3 reveals
basic shifts of emphasis and rationale. The earlier jury selection
statute accorded priority to exclusionary provisions. At the outset
it established certain hurdles of ineligibility of which potential
jurors were required to be free in order to escape disqualifica-
tion. 124 The current statute, to be sure, contains qualifications for
jury service. Nevertheless, priority emphasis is now given to a pol-
icy declaration calling for random selection from a fair cross sec-
tion of the community.125 This declaration of policy is followed
and reinforced by a new section dealing specifically with the pro-
hibition of discrimination.
12
The emphasis and rationale of the pertinent Pennsylvania stat-
utes seem to be more similar to the now discarded federal guide-
lines than to the policies of the 1968 federal revision. 27 Signifi-
cantly, there is no policy declaration to the effect that juries be
representative of the community or that all citizens have the op-
portunity and obligation to serve as jurors. Qualification hurdles
are accorded prominent status. 12 Opportunities for exemption,
with their adverse consequences to cross representation, vary with
the classes of counties. In counties of the first and third class, it
would appear that any person summoned could be excused by
showing cause to the satisfaction of the court."29 In the provisions
for second class counties, certain groups are singled out for ex-
121. United States v. Torquato, 308 F. Supp. 288, 290 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
122. U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, 1968, Vol. 2, p.17 98.
123. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-74 (1967).
124. Act June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1861, 62 Stat. 951 (1948), as amended
28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1972).
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1972).
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1972).
127. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 941-1342 (1962).
128. Id. at § 1322.
129. Id. at §§ 1257, 1327.
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emption from service, but the list of those accorded the privilege
of being excused is in itself lengthy and contrasts markedly with
the few categories exempted under the federal statutes.
130
V. FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT TO INSURE PROPER
STATE JURY SELECTION
Although the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury is far
less extensive in state than in federal actions, once a state chooses
to provide grand and petit juries, whether or not required to do
so, it must hew to federal constitutional criteria, including proper
jury selection procedures.131 Furthermore, the federal and state
courts share the duty of insuring the defendant of his right to equal
protection and due process throughout the procedure of his being
brought to justice in a state tribunal.
32
Certain recent decisions illustrate the prerogative of the federal
judiciary to assume jurisdiction where those in charge of state jury
selection have been discriminatory in their actions. In Turner v.
Fouche1 3 the Supreme Court dealt with a challenge to the consti-
tutionality of the system followed in many Georgia counties
whereby the selection of the board of education was left to the
members of the grand jury. The complaint alleged that blacks
were perennially underrepresented on the grand jury panel, which
was selected by white jury commissioners. The Court held that a
prima facie case of discrimination existed where there was a sig-
nificant disparity between the percentages of black residents as a
whole and blacks on the jury lists if the disparity originated par-
tially or wholly at the juncture in the selection process where the
jury commissioners employed their subjective judgment.'34
It must be noted that the Court did not hold the statute un-
constitutional simply because it permitted the jury commissioners
130. Id. at § 1279. Among those to be exempted automatically in
counties of the second class are attorneys at law, physicians, professional
nurses in active practice, school teachers, employees of municipal police
and fire departments and all county, state, and federal employees. Those
excluded on request include druggists, undertakers, ministers, members
of religious orders, persons who served nine years or more in the Pennsyl-
vania National Guard, those honorably discharged after serving nine
months or more in the active service of the United States, and others who
cannot serve without hardship, loss, or serious inconvenience. New Jer-
sey statutes are similar, adding exemptions for such categories as telegraph
and telephone personnel and fish and game protectors. N.J. REv. STAT.
§ 2A:69-2 (1972).
131. Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 406 (1942).
132. Id.
133. 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
134. Id. at 360.
to invoke their subjective judgment. The Georgia officials had re-
lied on the constitutionality of the statute on its face in an attempt
to defeat the Supreme Court's intervention in the matter. It was
the state's assertion that a distinction must be made between at-
tacks on statutes and attacks upon the result of their administra-
tion on the local level, and they urged that their case fell within
the latter category so that the Supreme Court would lack jurisdic-
tion to entertain an appeal.13 5 Although the Court confirmed the
state officials assertion of the constitutionality of the statute, it
nevertheless asserted its jurisdiction over the matter by pointing to
the distinction between the unconstitutionality of a statute either
on its face or as applied and the unconstitutionality of the result
obtained by the use of a statute not itself attacked as invalid.13
Since the result of the application of the statute denied to some the
privilege of being considered for public service on the basis of dis-
tinctions which violated federal guarantees, the Court sustained
the petitioner's allegation of discriminatory exclusion from jury
service.
1 7
The applicability of Turner to the key-man question is several-
fold. The use of key men inevitably results in the exercise of sub-
jective judgment, not once, but twice in the juror procurement
process: jury commissioners must first decide whom they will
consult as key persons and key persons must then decide whom
they will recommend for inclusion in the jury lists. Furthermore,
the nondiscriminatory face of the key-man statute can never be a
shield to challenge of the system. The Court will assume jurisdic-
tion and look to the outcome of the implementation of the statute,
regardless of how fair the statute may be on its face. In this re-
spect, the Court's position in Turner is similar to that which it as-
sumed in Peters v. Kiff. 13  Kiff also dealt with the unconstitu-
tionality of the results of certain jury selection practices rather
than with the unconstitutionality of the jury selection statutes in
and of themselves. 3 9 As with Turner, the statutes with which
Kiff was concerned were allowed to stand although the unconstitu-
tional results of their implementation were set aside.
Turner also shows the Court's use of random jury selection as
the standard by which the validity of all other jury selection sys-
terns must be judged.
The undisputed fact was that Negroes composed only 37%
of the. . . citizens on the. . . list from which the jury was
drawn. That figure contrasts sharply with the representa-
tion that their percentage (60%) of the general. . . popula-
135. Id. at 353 n.1O.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 359.
138. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
139. Id. at 2169.
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tion would have led them to obtain in a random selec-
tion.
140
Thus, although not holding subjective selection statutes invalid in
and of themselves, the Court seems to have intimated that ran-
domized procedures are to be preferred for their objectivity and
their safeguards against deliberate prejudice in any specific in-
stance."'
The suspect nature of the use of subjective judgment in jury
selection is specifically applied to the key-man process in Smith v.
Yeager.142  In this appeal to the Third Circuit, a black male de-
fendant contended that the key-man system used to select grand
jury venires and the practice of choosing petit jury venires from
the voting lists and city directories were unconsitutional because
they excluded disproportionate numbers of Negroes, women, work-
ing class persons, and residents of the city of Newark. Because of
its disposition on the key-man issue, the court did not reach the
question of the constitutionality of the lists from which petit jury
selections were made.
On the lower level it had been held that a showing of steady
underrepresentation of various groups on the grand jury was in it-
self insufficient to make out a prima facie case of discrimination.
143
The additional element required by the trial court was a deliberate
practice of total exclusion, a deliberate practice of token inclusion,
or a deliberate interference with an otherwise valid procedure.
44
Yeager rejected the requirement of showing deliberate discrimina-
tion above and beyond a showing of consistent underrepresentation
and held that the underrepresentation of blacks on the grand jury
was the likely result of the jury commissioners' seeking out sug-
140. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 359 (1970).
141. The Court has not issued a definition of random selection. The
Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 is similarly lacking in any descrip-
tion of the mechanics of a randomized procedure. Instead, the Act lays
down some general guidelines for random jury selection and states that
each judicial district may devise its own method of meeting the require-
ment. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1972). Basic to the random technique, however,
is the indiscriminate selection of names from a broadly comprehensive list,
such as the tax rolls or the voter registrations. An apparently acceptable
approach is illustrated by the following hypothetical. The responsible offi-
cials of a certain judicial district determine that 1 out of every 100 persons
on the list will be required to fill the panels for the terms of court in ques-
tion. A number from 1 through 100 is selected by draw. If, for example,
the number 9 is chosen, a summons to jury duty would be sent to the 9th
person on the list, the 109th, the 209th, and so forth.
142. 465 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972).
143. Id. at 274.
144. Id.
gesters of names for grand jury duty.145 Although the Third
Circuit repeatedly spoke in terms of "consistent" underrepresenta-
tion, the United States Supreme Court has stated that discrimina-
tion does not necessarily depend upon systematic exclusion con-
tinuing over a long period or practiced by a succession of jury
commissioners. 146 Accordingly, it would appear that the holding in
Yeager could be validly extended beyond cases where there exists
long continued absence of a definite class from jury lists.
Ironically, Yeager arose from circumstances in which the key-
man system had been relied upon to correct the lack of Negro
names in the jury list. In 1964 the responsible officials had solic-
ited juror recommendations from several blacks, including two
judges, the director of the Newark Urban League and others. The
special appeal produced approximately 250 names. The names that
were gathered by this concerted effort were exhausted prior to the
time when the events in question took place,147 and since there
were no significant replenishments, the composition of the list was
again deficient when the Yeager prosecution began.
Deterioration over the course of the years is not the only
weakness to which even a thorough effort to establish a valid key-
man system is vulnerable. Even in the case of a single usage of
the system under unusually close court supervision the inherent
weaknesses of the key-man method can render its results unsatis-
factory. For example, at one point in the controversy that ulti-
mately led to Turner, blacks who were familiar with the black
community were employed to assist the jury commissioners in ob-
taining a valid jury list. Nevertheless, under pressures of court
order and a virtual trial of the system itself, the effort failed to
produce a venire which was acceptable.
149
It is submitted that any procurement system that calls for the
exercise of discretion at the initial stage of procurement entails
danger of discrimination. 1 4 9 Irrespective of the constitutional right
of states to continue such procedures, whenever a jury commis-
sioner or his assistants employ their subjective judgment, there is
provided a potential opportunity for injustice. This is true no mat-
ter what the motives of the official whose work is being chal-
lenged. 150 In the face of these dangers courts and juror procure-
ment officials have certain remedial devices at their disposal. On
the one hand, they can deliberately attempt to balance jury lists, al-
though certainly not the panels of specific cases,' 5" through the
purposeful inclusion of members of groups against which discrimi-
145. Id.
146. E.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 290 (1950).
147. Smith v. Yeager, 465 F.2d 272, 281 (3d Cir. 1972).
148. 396 U.S. 346, 357-58 (1970).
149. State v. Rochester, 54 N.J. 85, 90, 253 A.2d 474, 476 (1969).
150. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972).
151. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
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nation has been practiced. Such purposeful inclusion has been
held nonviolative of the equal protection and due process clauses
of the fourteenth amendment.112 It is submitted, however, that
this technique of deliberate balancing is not the most satsifactory
remedy available. Even if an acceptable attempt is made at divid-
ing the community into its constituent population elements, there
seems to be an inevitable tendency to rely upon the upper strata
of the various sub-communities to provide names for the jury
list. 153 Furthermore, conscious balancing may produce the adverse
effect of prompting jurors who know of the attempts at balancing
the identifiable groups to assume that they are on the jury to up-
hold the supposed prejudices of their group rather than to deter-
mine justice without reference to group distinctions. In contrast,
random selection is far less fraught with the dangers of discrimina-
tion. Since it excludes all selection by the jury commissioners at
the initial stage in juror procurement, it eliminates the tendency
toward selecting potential jurors from the upper socio-economic
levels of the various identifiable groups. Furthermore, since it is
the only method which in actuality affords every qualified juror an
equal chance of being called for service, it is in full accord with
the representative cross section test, which has in recent years
assumed an increasing importance in determining the constitution-
ality of juries alleged to have been summoned in a discriminatory
manner.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no inherent reason for state use of the key-man jury
selection system to continue. The federal judiciary has taken meas-
ures to set it aside, and surely the same factors and considerations
which led to its removal from the federal system are present in
the state systems as well. The mere fact that the federal courts
have refused to hold unconstitutional state use of the method pro-
vides no basis for continued state reliance upon it. Even though
the federal courts do not declare the suggester system practices
invalid on their face, there is always the prospect that the result
of a particular instance of its employment will be unconstitu-
tional. A practice which is so susceptible to misuse, so increasing-
152. E.g., Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 975 (1967).
153. For example, black judges and the director of the Newark Urban
League are reported as having been consulted in Smith v. Yeager, 465 F.2d
272, 277 (3d Cir. 1972).
ly subject to attack, so detracting from the confidence that should
be accorded the judicial system, and which serves no valid ends
that cannot be produced by other methods, should be discarded.
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